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Oligarch vs. Nationalist: Ukraine’s 
2014 Parliamentary Elections
Alexandr Burilkov
Ukraine’s October 2014 elections resulted in a parliament divided between three new 
major power blocs: the Poroshenko Bloc, the People’s Front, and the Opposition Bloc. 
Formed from the atomized remnants of Ukraine’s pre-Maidan parliamentary landscape, 
the new parties differ strongly in their bases and visions for the future of Ukraine.
Analysis
  Ukraine transitioned from a bipolar party system, mainly based on the regional pa-
tronage networks of prominent oligarchs from western and eastern Ukraine, to a 
post-Maidan electoral landscape where the ruling Poroshenko Bloc depends on an 
uneasy alliance with the activist nationalists of the People’s Front to advance badly 
needed economic and security reforms.
  The end of the old party system had the positive outcome of bringing to power a 
more technocratic administration that has the chance to preserve Ukrainian nation-
al unity and steer the country toward transparency and prosperity.
  Current challenges are the fragility of the ruling coalition, which can only gain le-
gitimacy by improving economic conditions and avoiding corruption, and the ex-
treme-right tendencies of some volunteer units fighting on behalf of the govern-
ment in the Donbass.
  The tense February 2015 Minsk II peace accord and the threat of Russia deepen-
ing its support for the separatists is likely to further damage the Ukrainian govern-
ment’s dwindling resources and its capacity for reform.
Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, Crimea, Donbass, nationalism, oligarchy, elections, paramilitary.
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Ukraine’s Bipolar Electoral Geography
Electoral geography is the study of elections and 
their results in the context of geographic factors 
and techniques. This specifically refers to geo-
graphic factors that affect the political choices 
and geographic structures of electoral systems 
that influence electoral results; a prime example 
is the art of gerrymandering electoral districts in 
the United States and elsewhere. In the Ukraini-
an case traditional markers of election results – 
such as urbanization, ethnolinguistics, and eco-
nomic outcomes – do not fully capture voting be-
havior, because the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme 
Council, unicameral parliament) is split between 
225 seats elected from proportional party lists 
and 225 seats elected from majoritarian single-
mandate districts; it is therefore appropriate to 
use spatial autocorrelation, a geographic tech-
nique that measures the distribution of results 
across space. More precisely, spatial autocorrela-
tion looks for clustering of similar results, or con-
versely, for randomly distributed results, which 
provide a more complete explanation of region-
alism and polarization in Ukrainian electoral pol-
itics, including the existence of ubiquitous oli-
garch patronage networks.1
The territory of modern Ukraine has been in-
vaded, settled, and disputed by many empires – 
Russian, Polish, and Austrian to name the most 
recent. The divisions within the Ukrainian na-
1 This statistical analysis (spatial autocorrelation, spatial pan-
el model) was conducted by the author. Data on Ukrainian 
elections comes from the Ukrainian Central Election Commis-
sion, online: <www.cvk.gov.ua/>.
tion and state are a testament to that legacy. While 
eastern Ukraine was the industrial heartland of 
the Soviet Union, western Ukraine remains large-
ly rural, and is the hotbed of Ukrainian nation-
alism. Stoked long ago by Polish conquest and 
Austro-Hungarian promotion of particularism, it 
undermined Imperial Russia’s hold on western 
Ukraine. Furthermore, westernmost Ukraine was 
the stronghold of ultranationalist Ukrainian orga-
nizations such as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 
which fought Soviet and German forces and mas-
sacred Polish and Jewish civilians in World War 2. 
Eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, was one of the 
heartlands of Soviet industry. As a result, it expe-
rienced waves of Russification, which resulted not 
only in significant populations of Russian-speak-
ing Ukrainians but also in the settlement of ethnic 
Russians on the Russian border and the Crimean 
Peninsula, where they displaced the exiled Tartar 
population.
These regional differences manifested follow-
ing the introduction of elections after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and Ukrainian independence 
in 1992. The east, with its massive foundries and 
factories that are still run in vertical Soviet style, 
encouraged the formation of dense patronage net-
works centered on the new oligarchs who were 
enriched by taking control of vast industrial as-
sets. These networks dominated Ukrainian poli-
tics under President Kuchma and were only weak-
ened in the wake of the 2002 Orange Revolution. 
Figure 1: Ukraine Parliamentary Elections, October 2012
  
 
 
Proportional      Single district
Purple – Fatherland; Blue – Party of Regions; Orange – UDAR; Brown – Svoboda; Grey – Independent.
Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine, online: <www.cvk.gov.ua>.
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The Orange Revolution saw Viktor Yushchen-
ko and Yulia Tymoshenko’s Fatherland Bloc come 
to power, which had its heartland in western 
Ukraine. Although the party promoted Ukrainian 
nationalism and populism for electoral purposes, 
its leadership also sought to reap the rewards of 
patronage and oligarchy by constructing a profit-
able rentier network centered on transit rights, es-
pecially for oil and natural gas, earning Tymosh-
enko the moniker “the gas princess.” This lasted 
until 2010 when the reins of power shifted to Ya-
nukovych and his “family,” based in Ukraine’s 
eastern industrial basin of the Donbass.
This state of affairs – where elections would 
be dominated by two blocs, one based in the West 
and another in the East – lasted until Maidan in 
2014. The parliamentary election of October 2012, 
the last one before Maidan, is illustrative.
Statistical analyses based on the spatial auto-
correlation method reveal very strong clustering 
in election results, with sharp divisions between 
the pro-Europe and pro-Ukraine Fatherland Bloc 
and the pro-Russia Party of Regions that reflect-
ed traditional divisions in Ukraine. Furthermore, 
Svoboda (Freedom), the far-right party of choice 
for Ukrainian ultranationalists, was deeply en-
trenched in the greater L’viv area. The lack of in-
dependent candidates in the East was a testament 
to the power of the Yanukovych “family,” while 
in the west, many local petty oligarchs and busi-
nessmen not entirely willing to cooperate with 
the Fatherland Bloc won seats as independents, 
including the current President Poroshenko, a 
skilled political operative then known for oppos-
ing Yushchenko and Tymoschenko’s influence on 
pro-Ukrainian politics. The only party whose re-
sults were not clustered, but rather more random-
ly distributed across the whole of Ukraine, was 
UDAR, Vladimir Klitschko’s center-right and pro-
European party, which suggests non-partisan ap-
peal to voters of a party perceived as more in line 
with center-right civic politics
The Collapse of the Bipolar Party System
The fragile equilibrium of Ukrainian bipolar pol-
itics was irretrievably shattered by Maidan, the 
Crimean annexation, and the Donbass conflict, 
which is referred to as an “antiterrorist operation” 
by the Ukrainian government. In late February 
2014 Yanukovych fled to Russia, and Arseniy Yat-
senyuk – the parliamentary leader of the Father-
land Bloc – became prime minister of an interim 
government based on a coalition of the main Maid-
an elements: Fatherland, the UDAR, and Svoboda. 
The interim government included several Svobo-
da members whose questionable decisions on lan-
guage policy, inter alia, greatly alarmed Russian-
speaking Ukrainians and Russians. Its instability 
and the election of Poroshenko as president, who 
had called for national unity, led to early parlia-
mentary elections in October 2014 – this time with 
a number of new parties.
The relative failure of the interim government 
is noteworthy as it was composed of a large sec-
tion of ultranationalist forces that served as the 
militant vanguard of the Maidan protests. The 
Proportional      Single district
Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine, online: <www.cvk.gov.ua>.
   
Figure 2: Ukraine parliamentary elections, October 2014
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consensus on interim governments is that in or-
der for them to be successful in enabling a long-
lasting peace, they should either be based on pow-
er-sharing arrangements (such as in Liberia) or be 
international in nature (such as in Kosovo); fur-
thermore, parallel institutions should be integrat-
ed, and civil society should be consulted in the 
legislative process. Given the lopsided nature of 
Ukraine’s interim government, it was unable to 
effectively represent Russian-speaking Ukrai-
nians and Russians or to reach out to the oligar-
chic structures that dominate economic and polit-
ical life in eastern Ukraine. It thus created fertile 
ground for pro-Russian separatism and Russian 
support of armed rebellion.
In the October 2014 elections Yanukovych was 
not the only conspicuously missing political vet-
eran; Tymoshenko had also been sidelined, and 
her Fatherland Bloc sunk into irrelevance. From 
the perspective of electoral geography, the most 
notable result of the election was the emergence 
of new blocs and new constituencies and the col-
lapse of the existing bipolar party system.
Spatial autocorrelation statistical analyses of 
the 2014 election provide far more varied results 
than do analyses of previous elections, especially 
for single-mandate districts. What is immediately 
clear is that there are now three distinct blocs com-
peting for votes as well as a huge fringe composed 
of independents and a smattering of nationalist 
and ultranationalist Ukrainian parties. In effect, the 
single-district level is highly fragmented, whereas 
the proportional level clusters around regionalist 
narratives of Ukrainian identity, Ukraine’s policy 
toward the separatists, and Ukraine’s place in Eu-
rope and European institutions.
Though pro-European in appearance, the Peo-
ple’s Front is a Ukrainian nationalist and popu-
list party at heart. Headed by Prime Minister Yat-
senyuk, its rise gutted Tymoschenko’s Fatherland 
Bloc, as it gained Fatherland supporters loyal to 
Yatsenyuk – and these were a majority given Ty-
moschenko’s shady past. The party also absorbed 
much of the far-right and ultranationalist forces 
prominent in the final days of Maidan, thus leav-
ing Svoboda and Right Sector as tiny parties com-
posed only of members unwilling to cooperate 
with Yatsenyuk’s more moderate policies on the 
question of Ukrainian identity and the Donbass 
crisis. The mark of ultranationalism remains, how-
ever, as the party has a military council – funded 
by western Ukrainian oligarchs – that coordinates 
with the official state security organs (i.e., the na-
tional guard and the Ministry of Defense) to man-
age the 50 or so volunteer battalions fighting in 
the Donbass; some, notably the Azov Battalion, 
are openly far right in nature. Despite achieving a 
remarkable success in the proportional elections, 
the party was unable to attract as many votes in 
the single-district elections; this was because peo-
ple voted based on economic preferences, select-
ing local business candidates who they felt would 
represent them better in tough economic times. 
Nevertheless, the People’s Front strongly relies 
on its western Ukrainian base and is likely to sur-
vive in the future, irrespective of economic condi-
tions, given its populist and nationalist roots and 
its links to oligarchs and patronage networks.
The Poroschenko Bloc is funded and promoted 
largely by President Poroschenko himself and oth-
er oligarchs loyal to him, such as Dmytro Firtash, 
the major shareholder in Ukraine’s largest televi-
sion channel. The bloc is therefore not immune 
to the patronage politics that dominate Ukraine 
and does sometimes adopt a populist narrative 
of moderate Ukrainian nationalism; this has in-
cluded a number of media appearances by Po-
roschenko in traditional Ukrainian peasant garb. 
Though an attempted merger with Klitschko’s 
UDAR failed, UDAR candidates ran as part of the 
bloc during the October elections. The bloc’s plat-
form, and most importantly, its stance and Po-
roschenko’s leadership since February 2014 con-
tinue to signal that the bloc is the most pro-Euro-
pean and center-right of the three major pro-Euro-
pean parties. This is evidenced by the bloc large-
ly concerning itself with objectively remedying 
Ukraine’s dismal economic situation, adopting a 
tough stance on the Donbass crisis, and assuag-
ing the concerns of ordinary Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians and Russians from the South and the 
East. The nomination of experienced foreigners to 
cabinet posts after the October 2014 election rein-
forces the perception that this is a bloc concerned 
with nonpartisan administration of the country, 
mirroring other center-right and liberal parties in 
Eastern Europe.
The Opposition Bloc consists of the remnants 
of Yanukovych’s “family” and of the Party of Re-
gions. Though the bloc is designed to gather pro-
Russian forces under one banner, it has not been 
wholly successful, as this task depends on gain-
ing the support of eastern oligarchs and their pa-
tronage networks. Given the conciliatory tone of 
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the Poroschenko campaign, the Opposition Bloc 
failed to gain support in traditionally pro-Russian 
regions that lack Soviet-era heavy industry, such 
as Mykolaiv and Kherson; nor was the bloc par-
ticularly successful in Odessa despite brutal anti-
Russian street violence occurring there. The frag-
mentation of former Party of Regions votes is par-
ticularly stark at the single district level, with pa-
tronage playing a huge role. The prevalence of in-
dependent and Poroschenko Bloc victories in the 
industrial cities of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporo-
zhye suggests that most eastern oligarchs remain 
ambivalent and prefer to wait for the Donbass cri-
sis and the internal struggles within the remnants 
of the Party of Regions to resolve themselves. It 
is unlikely these wealthy clans and businesspeo-
ple will seek much of a coherent pro-Russian plat-
form beyond protection of the rights and privileg-
es of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians, 
since many hold significant assets in and around 
Donetsk – assets that will be of little use if trapped 
in a frozen conflict or, in an unlikely case, incorpo-
rated outright into Russia.
More Parties, More Problems
The October 2014 election is considered to have 
been conducted in a free and fair fashion, and 
it brought to parliament a diverse group of par-
ties. Some of the outcomes of the election are cau-
tiously positive. The far right-wing Svoboda lost 
its clustered and stable base in western Ukraine 
and is now confined to urban areas where it is able 
to muster sufficient support among the more ex-
treme Maidan activists, disaffected working-class 
individuals, and football ultras. Meanwhile, the 
even more extreme Right Sector only managed to 
gain votes in a district close to the front where a 
high number of volunteer battalions are stationed. 
Moreover, the success of the Poroschenko Bloc 
in traditionally pro-Russian areas indicates that 
the Ukrainian political landscape does have the 
chance to move past patronage and ethnicity to 
genuine civic politics.
For all the positive outcomes, the election al-
so generated a lot uncertainty and a number of 
negative outcomes. For instance, despite ultra-
nationalism appearing to have been discredited 
and stamped out, the reality is that much of Svo-
boda and Right Sector were incorporated into the 
People’s Front, which has a very stable regional 
base. This suggests that irrespective of whether 
a party changes its name or leadership, national-
ist ideology will continue to thrive. Furthermore, 
the military council of the People’s Front legiti-
mizes Ukrainian nationalism since it organizes 
the volunteer battalions on behalf of the Ministry 
of Defense. Though the battalions’ actual perfor-
mance on the front is questionable, their morale 
and prestige is undeniably high, and the expedi-
ency of the Donbass crisis dictates that the gov-
ernment is not particularly picky when it comes to 
manpower. However, certain volunteer battalions 
have been accused of serving as microarmies for 
oligarchs (in the case of Dnipro-1) and of embrac-
ing extreme right politics (in the case of Azov-1). 
Their continued existence poses a challenge to 
the Ukrainian state’s monopoly on force. This is-
sue is compounded by the fact that international 
pressure to delegitimize these respected wartime 
volunteers would be perceived as foreign inter-
vention and only serve to antagonize Ukrainians 
of a nationalist disposition. Collusion between 
the state security organs and the volunteers, or 
independent action by the volunteers, could sour 
relations between Ukraine’s various ethnolin-
guistic groups and threaten the fragile unity of 
the country. 
Whatever the resolution of the Donbass crisis 
may be, Ukraine’s stability will not be positive-
ly affected by the proliferation of heavily armed 
combat veterans not controlled by the state – ma-
ny of whom hold questionable political views that 
are partly or wholly incompatible with Europe-
an ideals. Though these formations were nominal-
ly legalized through integration into the national 
guard of the armed forces, this does automatical-
ly guarantee that they will obey state commands. 
Paradoxically, if planned aid to Ukraine’s military 
fulfills its purpose of improving the dismal state 
of the regular army – thus rendering the issue of 
manpower and the necessity of volunteer forma-
tions at the front less pressing – the issue will be-
come that of transferring these units to rear eche-
lon duty, eventually demobilizing them altogeth-
er, and then reintegrating their personnel back in-
to civilian life. The Ukrainian government has do-
ne fairly well in controlling and directing volun-
teers – in contrast to Russian claims of “terrorist 
battalions” – but the fact remains the risks posed 
by the liberal use of volunteer formations persist 
as long as the conflict drags on.
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The Poroschenko Bloc appears to have won 
a fairly convincing victory at the polls, giving it 
a mandate for badly needed reforms. This vic-
tory, however, is more fragile than it appears at 
first glance. While results for the bloc cluster, they 
do so around urban agglomerations; this signals 
that voting depends on economic issues, and that 
the bloc cannot rely purely on a loyal regionalist 
base. This also means the party’s legitimacy, and 
by extension the legitimacy of the president and 
the current government, depends almost entirely 
on the competent handling of the economy first 
and foremost. With Ukrainians exhausted and un-
certain about the future, the issues of security and 
federalization are a distant secondary concern. 
Although this is true for every Eastern Europe-
an party pursuing a center-right, liberal, and pro-
European platform, it does put tremendous pres-
sure on the government and its short-term perfor-
mance. If it is unable to provide amelioration in 
the standards of living and the provision of pub-
lic goods or, even more devastatingly, if there is 
a major scandal involving corruption at the gov-
ernmental and/or party level, the party will most 
likely be unable to govern or win the next elec-
tion. Such an event would expose Ukraine to an 
uncertain future and pave the way for nationalist 
forces to come to the fore. Given the disorganiza-
tion in the ranks of the Opposition Bloc, and the 
many pro-Russian votes lost in the annexation of 
Crimea and the Donbass conflict, it is almost cer-
tain that without a credible showing by the Po-
roschenko Bloc, the People’s Front and aligned na-
tionalist forces will take the next election.
The Cost of Chaos
As previously stated, many pro-Russian votes 
were lost in the crises. This means that pro-Rus-
sian parties will no longer be able to exert the 
same kind of electoral pull they did under Yan-
ukovych. This bodes well for Ukrainians wishing 
to create a more transparent and responsive de-
mocracy, but it does come with its own set of is-
sues. Above all, it reduces the possibility of Rus-
sian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians being rep-
resented in national politics, which was ultimate-
ly the originally stated grievance in eastern pro-
tests against the February interim government. If 
technocratic politics fails and Ukrainian national-
ism comes to dominate national-level politics, it 
will be difficult to guarantee fairness to these eth-
nolinguistic groups through electoral methods. 
Previously, the bipolar nature of Ukrainian pol-
itics on the surface suggested that ethnolinguis-
tic issues dominated; in reality, however, compet-
ing clans of oligarchs were at the root of elector-
al competition, rather than any kind of coherent 
nationalist program. But resurgent Russian pow-
er and interference, combined with the cataclysm 
of Maidan, will ensure that Ukrainian politics is 
no longer solely dominated by personal interests 
and patronage networks; the danger is that it will 
set the darker sides of nationalism and factional-
ism loose.
The Minsk II peace accord of February 2015 
calls for a ceasefire, the establishment of a demil-
itarized zone, the withdrawal of heavy weapons 
and artillery by both sides, amnesty for separat-
ists, exchange of prisoners, and the restoration of 
Ukrainian sovereignty with a high degree of au-
tonomy for the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The 
peace accord further destabilizes the position of 
the government and that of the Poroschenko Bloc 
within the ruling coalition. Leaving aside the an-
titerrorist operation, the accord ensures that Kiev 
must maintain a significant military presence in 
the East, given that anything else would be per-
ceived as a tacit surrender to possible dismem-
berment of the country. Furthermore, one of the 
provisions of Minsk II is the withdrawal of heavy 
weapons from the ceasefire line. With regard to 
the separatists’ weaponry, the accord specifical-
ly listed extremely advanced systems such as the 
Pantsir-S1 SAM vehicle (entered Russian service 
in 2012) and the Tornado-S rocket artillery vehicle 
(entered Russian service in 2014), suggesting the 
separatists appear to be better armed than most 
small NATO members at this stage. Given its cur-
rent state and the limited resources available to 
Ukraine, the Ukrainian armed forces simply can-
not repel firepower of that magnitude should the 
rebels either choose to violate Minsk 2 and push 
westward or simply engage in low-level warfare 
along the ceasefire line. Further mobilization by 
Kiev, which is already proving costly, can be com-
fortably matched by steady separatist and Russian 
escalation. Fatigue among ordinary Ukrainians re-
sulting from the cost of the war and stagnation of 
the economic promises of Maidan will further in-
crease the likelihood of a return to polarizing na-
tionalist narratives and destabilize the prospect of 
a return to normality.
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